We present a novel, o -line approach for evaluating incident detection algorithms. Previous evaluations have focused on determining the detection rate versus false alarm rate curve | a process which we argue is inherently fraught with di culties. Instead, we propose a cost{bene t analysis where cost mimics the real costs of implementing the algorithm and bene t is in terms of reduction in congestion. We argue that these quantities are of more practical interest than the traditional rates. Moreover, these costs, estimated on training data, can be used both as a mechanism to ne{tune a single algorithm as well as a meaningful quantity for direct comparisons between di erent types of incident detection algorithms. We demonstrate our approach with a detailed example.
Introduction
The cost of delay on freeways caused by non-recurring incidents is signi cant. Some estimate that the cost will be $35 billion/year by the year 2005 J. A. Lindley, 1986] . To reduce the impact of an incident, a tra c management center (TMC) needs to quickly detect and remove it from the freeway. A large literature of automatic incident detection algorithms (AID's) has emerged to address the problem of quick detection. AID's which can operate on data collected by ubiquitous inductance loop detectors include simple ltering Stephanedes and Chassiakos, 1993] , pattern recognition Payne et al., 1976 , Payne and Tignor, 1978 , Tsai and Case, 1979 , catastrophe theory Persaud and Hall, 1989] , and more recently neural networks Cheu, 1993, Hsiao et al., 1994] and genetic algorithms Abdulhai and Ritchie, 1997] .
Funding for this research was provided in part by NSF-DMS 9313013 to NISS and California PATH MOU-353. Faced with such a large literature, practitioners have a sizeable task in determining which | if any | AID to implement. Adding to the di culty is the fact that most algorithms are presented alone in the literature and in such a way that meaningful, literature{based comparisons between AID's are nearly impossible. Further, most AID's depend on a set of parameters that must be set (\tuned") by the practitioner. Unfortunately, setting parameters can be very di cult in practice, and performance can be very sensitive to these settings. Since poor performance usually translates into an unacceptably high rate of false alarms, many practitioners nd AID's too problematic for implementation in large urban environments Balke, 1993] . We present a methodology that will enable practitioners to both tune algorithms and make meaningful, direct comparisons between AID's.
Standard evaluation of AID's is in terms of detection rate (DR) versus false alarm rate (FAR) curves | where the higher the curve, the better the algorithm. We feel that this approach has several major di culties, of which we now list but two. First, to discuss these rates requires an a priori judgement by the researcher as to what constitutes an incident and what is detectable. This subjectiveness can lead to separate studies classifying di erent events as incidents on the same data set. Consequently, fair comparisons between di erent algorithms are nearly impossible from the literature alone.
A second problem is that DR-FAR curves treat all incidents with equal importance. That is, failing to detect a low{impact breakdown on the shoulder contributes equally towards the the false alarm rate as missing a major accident that causes hours of congestion. From a practical point of view, this is a fundamental aw. Similarly, all detections, regardless of the delay in the time to detection, count equally in the detection rate. Practically speaking, this too is nonsense. Since average time to detection is usually reported separately from the DR-FAR curve (if it is reported at all), the trade-o between the DR-FAR curve and the average time to detection is seldom clear.
Our approach to evaluating AID's attempts to solve these problems by abandoning DR-FAR curves in favor of a more natural cost function. Namely, to evaluate a speci c AID we estimate the cost that would be incurred from delay experienced if that AID were actually implemented. To this cost we add the cost of implementing the AID (dispatching tow trucks, etc.). Both of these costs are based on some assumptions and estimated from training data. By holding these assumptions xed, however, the costs are directly comparable across di erent algorithms and can be used in tuning an individual algorithm. Moreover, by dealing with congestion/implementation costs instead of DR-FAR curves, the severity of the incidents and time to response are automatically factored into the analysis.
Reducing congestion is by no means the sole purpose of incident detection. Representing an AID by a single number based on delay and the cost of responding can not possibly account for all such purposes. Some important considerations may not be quanti able at all. However, congestion and implementation costs are important criteria, which can be evaluated to inform decision making. A meaningful univariate criterion permits systematic exploration of tuning parameters within algorithms and comparisons between algorithms | important, practical goals that seem extremely di cult, if not impossible, to achieve from the traditional methods of evaluation.
Finally, our approach allows exible formulations of cost; for example, the cost function could re ect increasing bene t for responding promptly to injury accidents. Our method requires only that the cost can be estimated from training data. Thus, the practitioner wishing to use his or her own measures of cost can do so based on our generic approach.
In the next section we present our methodology for a generic cost function. This is done intentionally as we feel that practitioners are best quali ed for making the assumptions linking congestion and utility which constitute a loss function. However, for concreteness we give an example in Section 3 in which it is necessary to make some speci c assumptions. Section 4 contains some general remarks about cost functions and possible extensions.
Methodology
In this section we describe our approach in some generality. At this level the ideas are quite simple. In Section 3 a speci c example is presented which illuminates the details behind the following general discussion.
We adopt an AID cost structure with two parts corresponding to delay and implementation. As an AID is tuned to be more sensitive, the more it reduces delay through the quick detection of incidents. On the other hand, greater sensitivity also translates into increased implementation cost, since the AID is calling for more interventions. The goal is then to nd a fully{tuned AID that strikes a balance between these con icting aims. Let S be an AID which depends on a vector of parameters, s . We seek a pair (S; s ) with low total cost for a given freeway system. To estimate total cost, we use training data, D, which is collected during a period in which AID interventions are not being made. D must contain two things: a list of the locations and durations of all incidents 1 (usually from probe vehicles) and the data su cient to implement the AID (usually inductance loop detector data). However, D could also incorporate such data as highway patrol logs, cellular phone data, video data, and travel times from vehicles with automatic toll collection tags. Such additional data would increase the precision of the cost function estimates.
Let the functions f and g denote the delay and implementation cost functions, respectively. The evaluation of f requires estimation of the delay if a certain (S; s ) were used. This is the subject of Section 3.1. Also present in f is a conversion from delay (in vehicle{hours) to cost (in dollars). g takes actions prescribed by (S; s ) (eg. \dispatch tow truck to location x at time t") and assigns a cost to these actions. These functions can be anywhere from very simple (our example in Section 3) to quite complex (see Section 4).
We t parameters for a particular S by nding If the dimension of the parameter space is not too large, an exhaustive search over a grid of values can be used to nd the minimum cost s . Otherwise, gradient search methods, like the Downhill Simplex Press et al., 1992] , are applied. In the latter case the usual caveats of local minima apply. Our list di ers importantly from that of the DR-FAR approach in that we do not pre-screen incidents for detectability. Any abnormal event can be added to the list as a possible incident. Of course, the de nition of \abnormal" is subjective, but the same subjective list is used for each AID under evaluation. Moreover, if a particular event causes no delay, then an AID will not be penalized for failing to detect it.
An Example
In this section we demonstrate our method using data from the Freeway Service Patrol Evaluation Project Skabardonis et al., 1995 , Skabardonis et al., 1997 collected from a seven mile section of freeway on I-880 in Hayward, California. This section of freeway was instrumented with type 170 loop controllers spaced approximately 1/3 of a mile apart. Each loop controller monitored eight to ten mainline, double-loop detectors. Flow, speed, and occupancy data were aggregated over 30{second intervals for our analysis. The project also used rotating probe vehicles to collect incident data. The interested reader can nd more details in the cited references.
We compare three AID's: The \do-nothing" AID, S 0 , the Basic California AID Payne et al., 1976, Payne and Tignor, 1978] , S 1 , and the Minnesota Algorithm Stephanedes and Chassiakos, 1993] , S 2 . Brief descriptions of S 1 and S 2 are given in the Appendix.
Evaluating equation (1) requires three tasks for each algorithm and our training data: (i) estimation of the delay that would have occurred using that algorithm and a given set of parameters (ii) conversion of this delay to cost, and (iii) calculation of implementation cost. The next three sub{ sections address these points in order. The nal sub{sections present results for our I-880 analysis.
Estimating Incident Delay
We now discuss the estimation of the counter-factual incident delay that would have been experienced under AID (S; s ). The key assumptions will provide a link between a reduction in incident duration and a reduction in delay. We begin by determining the actual delay associated with each incident in our training data. This requires a list of incidents with corresponding time{space extent as well as ow and speed data. 2 We rst determine the delay for a segment (link) of freeway based on the di erence in travel times between normal and incident conditions Epps et al., 1994] . The de nition of delay is simply the extra time it takes to cross a freeway segment multiplied by the number of vehicles on the segment:
where i indexes link, d i is the delay in vehicle-hours, l i is the length of the link in miles, f i is the link ow, V i is the current link speed (mph), and V T is the typical link speed under incident{free conditions for that time of day. Note that it is possible to determine this delay for each freeway link at each time period from only loop detector data. Of course, if more precise data are available, one should incorporate them to get better estimates in (2). Next, we compile this link-by-link delay data into contour plots of delay. This allows us to associate buildups of delay with speci c incidents . From this we can determine the actual delay for each incident. Denote the delay from the kth incident by d k 0 . We now turn to estimating the delay of incident k if (S; s ) were implemented. We denote this hypothetical delay by d k s . For S 0 , we already have d k s 0 = d k 0 since D was collected under S 0 . For other AID's, we rst estimate the reduction in incident duration, and then we convert this reduction in duration into a reduction in delay. If the incident is not detected, then it is again natural to take
To express delay as a function of incident duration we make the assumption that one can model the incidents with a standard queuing model. Alternative assumptions are brie y discussed in Section (4). Figure 1 is a standard cumulative delay plot for a general incident May, 1990] which 
In equation (3) the actual incident duration, t, is known from our training data, and d k 0 is known from our previous calculations. The constants f d , f c , and f I are the demand, discharge capacity and capacity during the incident, respectively. Suppose our AID calls for an intervention that reduces the duration to t 0 t. Then, by ( In this example we make the simple assumption that T = = 10 minutes for all incidents. See Section 4 for other possibilities.
We note that researchers without probe vehicle data may bene t from simulated loop detector and incident data. To do so, one generates incidents of various types and calculates the delay for each incident by plugging baseline values for f I , f d , and f c into (3). The incident capacity, f I , should depend on the incident type. Using highway patrol incident data is another alternative to deploying probe vehicles.
Converting Delay into Cost
Having estimated the kth incident's hypothetical delay under (S; s ), we now convert this delay into cost. One simple assumption is that each vehicle-hour of delay costs K D dollars. Thus, f(S; s ;
where the sum is over incidents. Section 4 discusses other possibilities.
Cost of implementation
Next, we assign an implementation cost to (S; s ) based on our training data. A signi cant portion of this cost is the cost of responding to the incidents detected by the AID. 
Again, generalizations are discussed in Section 4.
Dispatching Tow Trucks
A nal detail for evaluating (7) is the translation of the output of (S; s ) into tow truck dispatches, D(x; t). Recall, (S; s ) produces a sequence of points (or \calls") in space{time for which an incident is believed to exist. Naively taking D(x; t) = 1 at every call can result in sending several (sometimes dozens) of tow trucks to the same point in space at consecutive time intervals. Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate some common sense into the nal dispatching decision. We refer to this map from the calls of an AID to tow truck dispatches as the dispatcher. After some initial trial{and{error, we settled upon a dispatcher that follows the following rule: If D(x 0 ; t 0 ) = 1, then D(x; t) = 0 for all (x; t) 2 x 0 ? b 1 ; x 0 + b 2 ] (t 0 ; t 0 + b 3 ]. This space{time black{out region discourages an AID from sending out multiple tow trucks to the same incident. In principal the b's could be added as parameters to the vector s , embedding the dispatcher inside (S; s ) completely. However, to reduce the dimension of the search in (1), we x b 1 = b 2 = 1 link and b 3 = 10 minutes. We attach this same proxy for a human dispatcher to all algorithms.
Tuning the California Algorithm
In this section, for expository purposes, we tune the California algorithm, S 1 , on data from a single day, February 18, 1993. This turns out to be a good day for both detection and expository purposes since we can clearly see incidents taking place that have well de ned congestion. In Section 3.7 we make a more appropriate analysis based on a collection of days. Figure 2 is a contour plot of delay (cf. equation (2)) for this day. The boxes on the contour plot represent the location and duration of the incidents as witnessed by the probe vehicles. The number in the lower left-hand corner of each box is the incident number in our database. So, for example, incident #117 occurred near loop detector #4 around 8:50am and lasted until around 9:15am. The congestion from this incident nally cleared around 9:40am. The widths of the incident boxes have no meaning. Of the eight incidents on this day, half had no visible impact on delay.
s 1 is three dimensional, so (1) can be found by evaluating the objective function on a 1000 point grid with ten points per dimension. Evaluating, of course, means running (S 1 ; s 1 ) on the loop detector data to produce the incident detection calls and then following the steps in sections 3.1 { 3.4 to compute the costs. Figure 3 superimposes the incident detection calls for a certain value of s 1 onto the delay contour plot. Incident #117 is quickly and consistently detected. Incidents #104 and #108 are also detected. However, #107 is completely missed, and we also have a large number of erroneous detection points between loop detectors 16 and 3. A closer inspection of the data reveals that loop detector 16 has extremely high occupancies | much higher than any of the other loops in this section of freeway. This loop detector station appears to have been mis-tuned and was erroneously reporting high occupancy values. This is especially damaging to the California Algorithm which is speci cally looking for di erences in occupancy values. Nevertheless, to simulate realistic conditions we leave these erroneous readings in our data.
These detection calls are then passed to our dispatcher algorithm (section 3.4). The resulting dispatches are shown as boxes on Figure 4 . The eleven dispatches at the bottom of the plot are false alarms. It is clear that a better dispatching strategy might recognize this lengthy pattern of false alarms and eventually ignore the calls between these faulty detectors. However, our naive dispatcher leads to a conservative estimate of the cost of the AID.
Finally, the tow truck dispatch information is processed according to sections 3.1 { 3. suggests that s 1 is a good set of parameters for this particular freeway and day. Of course, one day is far from adequate to settle on parameters. We note that it is entirely plausible for a family of detection algorithms to yield a cost that is no better than the do-nothing cost over the entire range of reasonable parameters. In this case, the particular AID family may not be bene cial (in terms of our costs) for the given freeway.
Varying Cost Assumptions
The ratio of the cost of dispatching a tow truck, K T , to the cost per vehicle-hour of delay, K D , is crucial in determining how S 1 compares to S 0 . A low ratio means S has less to lose from dispatching tow trucks. In the previous section we used K T =K D = 7, which may not be appropriate for all regions. While we dispatch correctly to incidents #104 and #117, the dispatch for incident #108 is too late to be of bene t. The eleven dispatches at the bottom are false alarms.
that no tow trucks are dispatched, in which case S 0 and (S 1 ; s 1 ) coincide.
Multiple Day Results
The performance curve given in Figure 6 is based on a single three hour period which, as previously indicated, is well{suited for detection. In order to fully evaluate the performance of an algorithm, we need to tune the algorithm with a larger and more varied data set. The results presented below use eight days from the I-880 database. For each day we take four three{hour periods: northbound and southbound for the AM and PM commutes. During these times there was recurrent congestion in the southbound direction during the AM shift and in the northbound direction during the PM shift.
These 96 hours of data contain a total of 76 incidents witnessed by at least two probe vehicles. Figure 7 displays some key characteristics of these incidents, where delay is calculated as in Section 3.1. Note that most incidents have zero delay, and consequently a cost{e ective AID would ignore them. Many traditional studies would screen out by hand these zero{delay incidents as \undetectable" before attempting to estimate DR-FAR curves. In our approach no such screening is necessary. Responding to a zero{delay incident simply incurs a cost without the bene t of reduction in delay.
The performance curve from training on all 96 hours is given in Figure 8 . The break-even point for the California Algorithm drops substantially to K T =K D 8, and the reduction in cost is slight at best over all values of K T =K D . The presence of recurrent congestion is likely to blame for this diminished performance relative to our single-day results. Further, with eight times as much data in our training set, the AID faces a greater range of conditions and incidents over which to optimize its parameters. Also shown is the performance curve for the Minnesota Algorithm Stephanedes and Chassiakos, 1993 ] generated over the same eight days. The Minnesota Algorithm appears to perform better than the California Algorithm for this data and the proposed 
Discussion
The cost analysis we propose is quite exible and allows for building cost models appropriate for particular problems. In this section we mention a few possibilities.
One major assumption is that T = = 10 minutes for all incidents. That is, each incident is reached ten minutes after its dispatch and is cleared exactly ten minutes later. A natural generalization is to make T depend on location, time of day, and the speed and occupancy near the incident.
Also, could depend on the type of incident (accident, breakdown, debris, mid{lane, shoulder, etc.) .
Allowing random T's and 's with distributions depending on the above variables is possible as well.
In some rare circumstances, data may even exist on driving and/or clearing times for tow trucks that actually arrived at the scenes of incidents. Such data could be used to estimate T's and/or 's.
The cost assumptions (6) and (7) could be generalized in a similar fashion. The cost of delay could depend on time and space. For instance, delay during the AM commute could be made costlier than delay during the PM, since the former reduces productivity by shortening the work day. Extra components of cost could also be incurred for delay experienced during certain types of incidents (eg. injury accidents). We then generalize (6) 
Here the 's play a similar role as the 's in (8). This is quite sensible since certain types of incidents may be costlier for a tow truck to remove than others. The constant is overhead incurred even if no dispatches are made. Resources for processing the loop data, additional infrastructure, and extra labor are among the items that could be considered overhead. Note that if > 0, then the ratios in Figure 8 are no longer bounded by one. Another assumption is that of the standard queuing model which underlies our link between duration and delay (3). However, other models are possible. For instance, one can postulate and analyze a model in which an incident leads to a velocity drop which is eliminated after clearance. With enough incident data and tow truck arrival data one might even try to establish an empirical relationship between tow truck arrival times and durations for di erent types of incidents. Whether such modi cations are important and/or worthwhile will require additional research.
One nal generalization is worth mentioning; our method allows comparisons between an AID and an incident management method that does not inherently have a performance curve. For example, consider the Freeway Service Patrol (FSP) roving tow truck system Skabardonis et al., 1995 , M. Morris, W. Lee, 1994 . We can still estimate implementation costs and delay costs using historical data and a few assumptions about how the FSP would operate. The common currency of cost allows for direct comparisons with more standard AID's, even though the usual notions of detection rate and false alarm rate do not make sense for FSP. 
The Minnesota Algorithm
The Minnesota Algorithm Stephanedes and Chassiakos, 1993 ] also looks at functions of occupancy at adjacent stations. However it rst takes temporal moving averages in order to lter out spurious di erences that would produce false alarms. Four parameters must be set (m; n; 1 ; 2 ). The integers m and n control the amount of averaging and are usually set such that m t = 5 minutes and n t = 3 minutes (where t is the length of each time period). We follow these conventional choices. The free parameters 1 and 2 are thresholds against which two functions of occupancy are compared.
Using the notation from above, 
w i (t) = 1 n P n?1 j=0 docc i (t + j) ? 1 m P m j=1 docc i (t ? j)
An incident is declared to have occurred during time period t between stations i and i + 1 if both variables exceed their respective parameters. Notice that (14) and (15) can not be evaluated until time period t + n.
